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Abstract
Blockchain protocols differ in fundamental ways, including the mechanics of selecting users to
produce blocks (e.g., proof-of-work vs. proof-of-stake) and the method to establish consensus (e.g.,
longest chain rules vs. Byzantine fault-tolerant (BFT) inspired protocols). These fundamental dif-
ferences have hindered “apples-to-apples” comparisons between different categories of blockchain
protocols and, in turn, the development of theory to formally discuss their relative merits.
This paper presents a parsimonious abstraction sufficient for capturing and comparing proper-
ties of many well-known permissionless blockchain protocols, simultaneously capturing essential
properties of both proof-of-work (PoW) and proof-of-stake (PoS) protocols, and of both longest-
chain-type and BFT-type protocols. Our framework blackboxes the precise mechanics of the user
selection process, allowing us to isolate the properties of the selection process that are significant
for protocol design.
We demonstrate the utility of our general framework with several concrete results that delin-
eate which properties are achievable by different types of blockchains under different synchrony
assumptions. For example:
• We prove a CAP-type impossibility theorem asserting that liveness with an unknown level of
participation (as in typical PoW protocols) rules out security in a partially synchronous setting
(as enjoyed by several BFT-type PoS protocols).
• Delving deeper into the partially synchronous setting, we prove that a necessary and sufficient
condition for security is the production of “certificates,” meaning stand-alone proofs of block
confirmation.
• Restricting to synchronous settings, we prove that typical protocols with a known level of par-
ticipation (including longest chain-type PoS protocols) can be adapted to provide certificates,
but those with an unknown level of participation cannot.
• Finally, we use our framework to articulate a modular two-step approach to blockchain secu-
rity analysis: (i) prove liveness and security properties for a permissioned version of a proto-
col; (ii) prove that the method of user selection extends these properties (with high probability)
to the original permissionless protocol.
*Roughgarden was supported in part by NSF Award CCF-1813188, ARO grant W911NF1910294, and a grant from the
Columbia-IBM Center for Blockchain and Data Transparency.
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1 Introduction
The task of a permissionless blockchain protocol is to establish consensus for message ordering over
a network of users. This job is made difficult by the fact that, being subject to the laws of physics,
the underlying communication network must have latency, i.e. broadcast messages will necessarily take
time to travel over the network of users. As a consequence of this latency, malicious users may purposely
cause the order in which messages are first seen to vary for different honest users, and some differences
in ordering will anyway be an honest consequence of varying propagation times between different nodes
of the network [DW13].
Network latency is especially problematic when we work at the level of individual transactions, which
may be produced at a rate which is high compared to network latency. For this reason, it is standard
practice to collect transactions together into blocks, which can then be produced at a rate which is much
lower compared to network latency. Given that we are working in a permissionless setting, the basic
question then becomes, “Who should produce the blocks?”. In some broad sense all permissionless
protocols answer this question in the same way. According to one protocol we might select users with
probability depending on their hashing power, while according to another we might select users with
probability proportional to their wealth. Users might be selected one at a time, or they might be selected
in batches and asked to carry out Byzantine-Fault-Tolerant (BFT) protocols defined in the permissioned
setting. In all of these cases, however, we decide upon a method of user selection and then we allow
those selected users to act as permissioned users, giving them roles such as block production, or voting
on blocks.
The main aim of this paper is to establish a framework for analysing permissionless blockchain pro-
tocols that blackboxes the precise mechanics of the user selection process, allowing us to isolate the
properties of the selection process that impact the way in which the protocol must be designed, or that
influence properties of the resulting protocol (such as security in a range of synchrony settings). In
Section 2 we describe a framework of this kind, according to which protocols run relative to a resource
pool. This resource pool specifies a balance for each user over the duration of the protocol execution
(such as hashrate or stake in the currency), which may be used in determining which users are permitted
to make broadcasts updating the state.
1.1 Our Contributions
We demonstrate the utility of our general framework with several concrete results that delineate which
properties are achievable by different types of blockchains under different synchrony assumptions. We
prove several results that show how basic properties of the user selection process necessarily impact the
security guarantees that can be provided by the protocol; these results demonstrate fundamental differ-
ences in the security guarantees that can be provided by proof-of-work and proof-of-stake protocols. We
will be concerned, in particular, with the distinction between scenarios in which the size of the resource
pool is known (e.g. PoS), and scenarios where the size of the resource pool is unknown (e.g. PoW). We
shall refer to the former case as the sized setting1 and the latter as the unsized setting.
1Actually, for the sized setting we will require a weaker condition than this – it will suffice, for example, that a function is
given in advance determining how the total size of the resource pool depends on the set of broadcast messages.
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A CAP-type impossibility result. By way of introduction, we establish a simple CAP-type theorem
for our framework, which asserts that a protocol cannot be live and secure in the unsized and partially
synchronous setting.2,3 While similar CAP-type theorems have already been shown for other blockchain
frameworks (see, for example, [GPS19, PS17]), the aim here is to begin the process of using our frame-
work to formally differentiate the security guarantees that can be achieved by permissionless protocols
using resource pools with fundamentally different properties. The hope is that, in particular, this will
help clarify the different capabilities of PoW and PoS protocols. The relationship with previous works
will be discussed in greater depth in Section 1.2.
Theorem 3.1. No protocol is live and secure in the unsized and partially synchronous setting.
We shall use the term adaptive as shorthand for “live in the unsized setting” and the term partition se-
cure for “secure in the partially synchronous setting.” Theorem 3.1 thus establishes a simple dichotomy
for permissionless blockchain protocols. A protocol can be adaptive or it can be partition secure, but
not both. It also draws a clean and formal line between longest chain protocols such as Bitcoin and
Ethereum [N+08, But18], or PoS implementations such as Snow White [BPS16] on the one hand, and
BFT protocols such as Algorand [CM19], Casper FFG [BG17] and PoS implementations of Tendermint
[Buc16] or Hotstuff [YMR+19] on the other. While the former group are all adaptive, the latter group
are all partition secure.
A necessary and sufficient condition for partition security. Next we prove a result that, to the best
of our knowledge, has no previous analogues in the literature. Protocols such as Algorand and other
BFT-type protocols achieve partition security through the production of what we shall call certificates.
These are sets of broadcast messages whose very existence suffices to establish block confirmation and
which cannot be produced by a (suitably bounded) adversary given the entire duration of the execution
of the protocol. Bitcoin does not produce certificates, because the existence of a certain chain does not
prove that it is the longest chain – a user will only believe that a certain chain is the longest chain until
presented with a longer (possibly incompatible) chain. Algorand does produce certificates, on the other
hand, because the very existence of a certain chain, together with appropriate committee signatures for
all the blocks in the chain, can suffice to guarantee (beyond a reasonable doubt) that the blocks in that
chain are confirmed. We will formally define what it means for a protocol to produce certificates in
Section 4.
The production of certificates is also functionally useful, beyond providing security against network
partitions. The production of certificates means, for example, that a single untrusted user is able to con-
vince another user of block confirmation (by relaying an appropriate certificate), and this is potentially
very useful in the context of sharding. If a user wishes to learn the state of a blockchain they were not
previously monitoring, then it is no longer necessary to perform an onboarding process in which one
2Liveness and security will be formally defined in Section 2. Roughly, a protocol is live if the number of confirmed blocks
can be relied on to increase during extended intervals of time during which message delivery is reliable. A protocol is secure
if rollback on confirmed blocks is unlikely.
3It is standard in the distributed computing literature [Lyn96] to consider a variety of synchronous, partially synchronous,
or asynchronous settings, in which users may or may not have clocks which are almost synchronised, or run at varying speeds,
and where message delivery might be reliable or subject to various forms of failure. These terms, together with the sized and
unsized settings, will be formally defined in Section 2. Roughly, in the synchronous setting that we consider, there is an upper
bound on message delay, while in the partially synchronous setting there may be unbounded network partitions.
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samples the opinions of users until such a point that it is likely that at least one of them was ‘honest’ –
one simply requests a certificate proving confirmation for a recently timestamped block.4
In the spirit of our investigation, which looks to understand to what extent today’s protocols “have
to look the way they are” given the security guarantees they achieve (as opposed to there being totally
unexplored regions of the protocol design space), a key question is then:
Q1. Are certificates fundamental to partition security, or an artifact of Algorand’s specific implemen-
tation? That is, are certificates the only way to achieve security in the partially synchronous
setting?
Our next result gives an affirmative response to Q1.
Theorem 4.1. If a protocol is partition secure then it produces certificates.
Certificates in the synchronous setting. Theorem 4.1 shows that the production of certificates is
equivalent to security in the partially synchronous setting. But what about Bitcoin? While Bitcoin does
not satisfy the conditions of Theorem 4.1, it clearly has some non-trivial security. The standard formal-
isation in the literature [GKL18, PSS17, Ren19] is that Bitcoin satisfies non-trivial security guarantees
in the synchronous setting, for which there is an upper bound on message delivery time. Even working
in the synchronous setting, though, it is clear that Bitcoin does not produce certificates. Again, we are
led to ask whether this is a necessary consequence of the paradigm of protocol design:
Q2. Could there be a Bitcoin-like protocol that, at least in the synchronous setting, has as strong
a security guarantee in terms of the production of certificates as BFT-type protocols do in the
partially synchronous setting?
Again, the crucial distinction is between the sized and unsized settings. The term “non-trivial adver-
sary”, which is used in Theorem 6.1 below, will be defined in Section 6 so as to formalise the idea that
the adversary may have at least a certain minimum resource balance throughout the execution. With
these basic definitions in place, we can then give a negative answer to Q2.
Theorem 6.1. Consider the synchronous and unsized setting. If a protocol is live then, in the presence
of a non-trivial adversary, it does not produce certificates.
So, in the unsized setting (in which protocols like Bitcoin operate), useful protocols cannot produce
certificates. Following on from our previous discussion regarding the relevance of certificates to shard-
ing, one direct application of this result is that it rules out certain approaches to sharding for PoW
protocols. In the sized and synchronous setting, though, it is certainly possible for protocols to produce
certificates. It therefore becomes a natural question to ask how far we can push this:
Q3. Does the production of certificates come down purely to properties of the process of user selec-
tion? Is it simply a matter of whether one is in the sized or unsized setting?
Our final theorem gives a form of positive response to Q3. We state an informal version of the theorem
below. A formal version will be given in Section 6.
4Such techniques can avoid the need to store block hashes in a sharding “main chain,” and the information withholding
attacks that come with those approaches.
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Theorem 6.2 (Informal Version). Consider the synchronous and sized setting, and suppose a protocol
is of ‘standard form’. Then there exists a ‘recalibration’ of the protocol which produces certificates.
Theorem 6.2 says, in particular, that all ‘standard’ PoS protocols can be tweaked to get the strongest
possible security guarantee, since being of ‘standard form’ will entail satisfaction of a number of con-
ditions that are normal for such protocols. Roughly speaking, one protocol will be considered to be a
recalibration of another if running the former just involves running the latter for a computable transfor-
mation of the input parameters and/or using a different notion of block confirmation. The example of
Snow White may be instructive here. At a very high level, Snow White might be seen as a PoS version
of Bitcoin. It is a PoS longest chain protocol, and it is not difficult to see that, with the standard notion of
confirmation, it does not produce certificates – an adversary can produce chains of blocks which are not
confirmed, but which would be considered confirmed in the absence of other blocks which have been
broadcast. So whether a block is confirmed depends on the whole set of broadcast messages. On the
other hand, it is also not difficult to adjust the notion of confirmation so that Snow White does produce
certificates. An example would be to consider a block confirmed when it belongs to a long chain of
sufficient density (meaning that it has members corresponding to most possible timeslots) that it could
not likely be produced by a (sufficiently bounded) adversary. We will see further examples like this
explained in greater depth in Section 6. Theorem 6.2 implies much more generally that PoS protocols
can always be modified so as to produce certificates in this way.
The punchline is that whether or not a protocol produces certificates comes down essentially to whether
one is working in the sized or unsized setting (e.g. whether the protocol is PoS or PoW). This follows
from the following results that we have already described:
(i) According to Theorem 3.1, only protocols which work in the sized setting can be secure in the
partially synchronous setting. According to Theorem 4.1, all such protocols produce certificates.
(ii) Theorem 6.1 tells us that, in the synchronous and unsized setting, protocols cannot produce cer-
tificates.
(iii) Theorem 6.2 tells us that all standard protocols in the sized and synchronous setting can be recal-
ibrated to produce certificates.
Reducing permissionless to permissioned: A modular approach to blockchain security analysis.
Finally, we show how our framework can be used to reduce the description and analysis of permis-
sionless protocols to the permissioned case. This means that describing a permissionless blockchain
protocol and proving that it satisfies basic properties, such as liveness and security, is now broken down
into two tasks:
(a) Providing such an analysis for a permissioned reduct, i.e. a permissioned form of the protocol that
we will describe in Section 7;
(b) Specifying and analysing the properties of an appropriate process of user selection, which selects
users according to their balance as specified by the resource pool.
Our work here can be viewed as a common generalization of, for example, the security analyses of
Algorand in [CM19] and of Bitcoin in [GKL18].
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1.2 Related Work
While a number of excellent papers (see, for example, [GKL18, PSS17]) describe frameworks for the
analysis of blockchain protocols, to our knowledge the framework presented here is the first to fully for-
malise an approach capable of properly modelling all significant features of both PoW and PoS protocols
simultaneously. The most common approach taken in previous papers establishing impossibility results
is to consider contexts in which a fixed number n of users carry out the protocol, as in the classical dis-
tributed computing setting, but where it is now to be understood that the number of users controlled by
any individual might depend on a resource such as their computational power. It is a difficulty for such
approaches that, in reality, for PoS protocols the balance of a user will depend on the set of broadcast
messages, and may be recorded differently from the perspective of different users at a single moment in
time. A user’s stake is therefore not a simple function of time, but rather of the set of broadcast messages
seen by a given user – indeed many attacks on PoS protocols [BCNPW19] involve taking advantage of
precisely this fact. Defining a framework as we do here allows us to overcome this issue, as well as
allowing us to formalise notions such as the timed and the sized and unsized settings, that play a crucial
role in the theorems of this paper.
The idea of blackboxing the process of user selection as an oracle (akin to our permitter, as described
in Section 2) was explored in [AM+17]. Our paper may be seen as taking the same basic approach,
and then fleshing out the details to the point where it becomes possible to prove impossibility results
like those presented here. As here, a broad aim of [AM+17] was to understand the relationship between
permissionless and permissioned consensus protocols, but the focus of that paper was somewhat differ-
ent than our objectives in this paper. While our aim is to describe a framework which is as general as
possible, and to establish impossibility results which hold for all protocols (and with as few assumptions
on the process of user selection as possible), the aim of [AM+17] was to examine specific permissioned
consensus protocols, such as Paxos [L+01], and to understand on a deep level how their techniques for
establishing consensus connect with and are echoed by Bitcoin.
The CAP theorem is one of the most celebrated theorems in the distributed computing literature.
The theorem proved by Gilbert and Lynch [GL02] is a formal version of a conjecture due to Brewer
[Bre00], which is made in the context of distributed web services. The theorem establishes an impossi-
bility result: It is impossible for such a distributed service to simultaneously achieve the three desirable
properties of consistency, availability, and partition tolerance. For formal definitions of these terms we
refer the reader to [GL02] and [Lyn96]. Roughly speaking, ‘security’ in our framework corresponds to
‘atomic consistency’ in the framework in which the CAP Theorem is proved in [GL02], and ‘liveness’
corresponds to ‘availability’. These correspondences are not exact, however. While availability requires
a response even during extended periods of asynchrony, our definition of liveness (see Section 2) ex-
plicitly rules out the requirement that new confirmed blocks should be produced under such conditions.
The key observation in the proof of Theorem 3.1 is that, in the unsized setting, extended periods of
asynchrony cannot be distinguished from a waning resource pool. Liveness therefore forces the produc-
tion of new confirmed blocks during appropriately chosen periods of asynchrony. Liveness and security
are thus incompatible in the partially synchronous and unsized setting, while the same is not true in the
partially synchronous and sized setting.
CAP-type theorems have been shown for other blockchain frameworks. In [PS17], for example, it was
shown that if the protocol is unsure about the number of players to a factor of 2 and still needs to provide
availability if between n and 2n players show up, then it is not possible to guarantee security in the event
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of network partitions. In [GPS19], the authors developed a useful weakening of the synchronous model,
in which honest users need not always be online, but where message delivery and honest participation
suffice to establish consensus protocols that can handle more than 1/3 of users being corrupt5. While
honest users may not be online in every round/timeslot, the guarantee is made that, for some χ ∈ [0, 1],
more than a χ fraction of nodes are not only honest but also online in each round. Precisely which set of
honest nodes are online in each round is controlled by the adversary. For this model, the authors prove a
CAP-type theorem establishing that consensus is not possible when χ < 12 −
1
n
(with n being the number
of users). The framework is different than that presented here, but the fundamental reasoning behind the
proof is the same as that for Theorem 3.1, and the same as for the proof of the original CAP Theorem
[GL02]. The proof of Theorem 3.1 is thus based on well established principles. The point of presenting
Theorem 3.1 here is to demonstrate the relevance of the sized and unsized settings, and to show how
they can be used to establish subtle interactions with notions of liveness and security. The sized setting
(in which PoS protocols operate) is permissionless, in the sense that one need not know the number of
participants or even how the total stake will vary over time in advance of running the protocol. All one
requires is advance knowledge of how a user’s stake is determined by the set of broadcast messages, and
this is enough that PoS protocols can be live and secure in the partially synchronous setting.
One consequence of Theorem 3.1 is that Bitcoin is not partition secure. This was proved in [PSS17].
1.3 The Structure of this Paper
Section 2 describes the basic framework that we shall use in order to blackbox the process of user
selection for permissionless blockchain protocols. The partially synchronous, synchronous, sized and
unsized settings will be formally defined in this section. We also define what it means for a protocol to
be live, and define our two basic security notions in this section. We prove Theorem 3.1 in Section 3.
In Section 4, we define what it means to produce certificates. We show that the two security notions
introduced in Section 2 are actually equivalent in the partially synchronous setting, and we prove Theo-
rem 4.1 for the resulting (single) security notion. In Sections 5 and 6 we then move on to consider the
synchronous setting. In Section 5 we show that, while the two security notions defined in Section 2 are
not equivalent in the synchronous setting, one can establish weak conditions under which they do satisfy
a form of equivalence. We then prove Theorem 6.1 and Theorem 6.2 in Section 6.
In Section 7, we define the notion of a permissioned reduct and show how it can be used to describe
modular proofs of liveness and security. In order to demonstrate this point we consider the example of
Bitcoin, and show how a modular presentation of the proof of liveness and security from [GKL18] can
be described in terms of a permissioned reduct.
Finally, in Section 8, we discuss gaps in the existing analysis, and directions for future research.
2 The Framework
2.1 Predetermined and Undetermined Variables
So that we can define properties such as liveness and security later on, it will be convenient to consider
protocols that are specified relative to a finite set of input parameters. For Algorand to run securely,
5Such protocols are not possible in the partially synchronous setting [DLS88].
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for example, one must first decide how long the protocol is to run for, and then choose committee sizes
accordingly. The duration of the execution is therefore required as a parameter of the protocol. Variables
that are specified before the execution of the protocol as input parameters, or which take the same value
for all executions of the protocol, are referred to as predetermined. Variables (such as the number of
users) that are not predetermined, will be referred to as undetermined.
2.2 The Users
Protocols are executed by an undetermined set of pseudonymous users, this set being of undetermined
size. Each user controls a set of public keys by which they will be known to other users. The variable U
is used to range over users, while U will be used to range over public keys – each user may have many
public keys. Amongst all users, there is one who is distinguished as the adversary and who controls an
undetermined set of public keys. Users other than the adversary are called honest.
We suppose that each user is a deterministic computing device, which has amongst the actions it can
perform calls to certain oracles, as well as certain external functionalities such as the ability to broadcast
messages. The protocol specifies an instruction set, which is a program which is run by every user, other
than the adversary. The adversary can follow any program of their choosing.
While we might think of the set of users as forming a network over which messages can propagate,
we do not make the network explicit in our framework. Users simply have the ability to broadcast
messages. Once a message is broadcast by a public key belonging to a given user, it may subsequently
be delivered to other users at different stages of the execution.
2.3 Network Failures
The protocol gives instructions to be carried out at each in a sequence of timeslots t = 0, 1, 2, . . .. For
each execution of the protocol, the number of timeslots is given as an input parameter, together with
a real time corresponding to each timeslot (i.e. the actual time at which those instructions should be
carried out). In order that the execution can actually be carried out, the real time between timeslots must
therefore suffice to carry out the given instructions. The appropriate length of time between timeslots
thus depends on the protocol to be modelled. For many PoS protocols, an appropriate length is slightly
more than the network latency, i.e. the time it takes a block to propagate the network. (Thus, each user
might carry out many instructions during a single timeslot.) We will see that PoW protocols might be
better modelled using very short timeslots.
For a given execution, the sequence of timeslots for which the protocol is to be run is called the
duration D. At the beginning of each timeslot in the duration, broadcast messages may be delivered to
various users. The message state relative to a given user is the set of all broadcast messages which have
been delivered to them, and is therefore monotonically increasing over time. In order to be broadcast, a
message must be valid, meaning that it must have a certain structure and that certain other conditions,
expanded on below, are also satisfied.
For example, if modelling Bitcoin or Snow White, a user’s message state will be the set of (valid)
blocks that have been delivered to them. Thus the message state will not, in general, be a single chain
of blocks. For Algorand, a user’s message state will be all those messages which have been delivered
to them, which are either valid blocks, or else the signed messages of committee members exchanged
while reaching consensus on blocks.
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It is standard in the distributed computing literature [Lyn96] to consider a variety of synchronous,
partially synchronous, or asynchronous settings, in which users may or may not have clocks which
are almost synchronised, or run at varying speeds, and where message delivery might be reliable or
subject to various forms of failure. For the sake of simplicity, we will suppose here that users’ clocks
are synchronised. We will, though, allow for periods of network failure, during which the adversary is
able to control message delivery. In order to formalise this, we will suppose that the duration is divided
into intervals that are labelled either synchronous or asynchronous (meaning that each timeslot is either
synchronous or asynchronous). We will suppose that, during asynchronous intervals, the adversary
is able to interfere with message delivery as they choose, i.e. the adversary can deliver messages when
they choose, or can stop messages being delivered at all. During synchronous intervals, we shall suppose
that messages are delivered within ∆ many timeslots. So ∆ is fixed (and known to the protocol), and if
t1, t2 ∈ I for a synchronous interval I, with t2− t1 ≥ ∆, then any message broadcast at t1 will be delivered
to all other users by t2. It will be convenient to suppose that ∆ ≥ 1.
We then distinguish two synchronicity settings. In the synchronous setting it is assumed that there are
no asynchronous intervals during the duration, while in the partially synchronous setting there may be
undetermined asynchronous intervals.
2.4 The Structure of the Blockchain
Amongst all broadcast messages, there is a distinguished set referred to as blocks, and one block which
is referred to as the genesis block. Unless it is the genesis block, each block B has a unique parent block
Par(B), which must be uniquely specified within the block message. Each block is produced by a single
user, Miner(B), but may contain other broadcast messages which have been produced by other users.
No block can be broadcast by U := Miner(B) at a point strictly prior to that at which its parent has been
delivered to U. Par(B) is defined to be an ancestor of B, and all of the ancestors of Par(B) are also
defined to be ancestors of B. If B is not the genesis block, then it must have the genesis block as an
ancestor. At any point during the duration, the set of broadcast blocks thus forms a tree structure. If M
is a set of messages, then we shall say that it is downward closed if it contains the parents of all blocks
in M. By a leaf of M, we shall mean a block in M which is not a parent of any block in M. If M is
downward closed and contains a single leaf, then we shall say that M is a chain.
2.5 The Resource Pool
Protocols are run relative to a (predetermined or undetermined) resource pool,6 which in the general
case is a function R : U×D×M→ R≥0, whereU is the set of public keys,D is the duration andM is
the set of all possible sets of messages. SoR can be thought of as specifying the resource balance of each
public key at each timeslot in the duration, possibly relative to a given message state. For a PoW protocol
like Bitcoin, the resource balance of each public key will be their (relevant) computational power at the
given timeslot (and hence independent of the message state). For PoS protocols, such as Snow White,
Ouroboros [KRDO17] and Algorand, however, the resource balance will be fully determined by ‘on-
chain’ information, i.e. information recorded in the message state M, and will reflect the user’s currency
balance.
6As described more precisely in Section 2.6, whether the resource pool is predetermined or determined will decide whether
we are in the sized or unsized setting.
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By the total resource balance T , we mean the sum of the resource balances of all public keys; this is
the function T : D×M→ R≥0 defined by T (t,M) =
∑
U R(U, t,M). It should be noted that the resource
pool is a variable, meaning that a given protocol may be expected to be live and secure with respect to a
range of resource pools.
2.6 The Sized and Unsized Settings
Just as we considered two synchronicity settings earlier, we also consider two resource settings. The
basic idea is that in the sized setting, the total resource balance is information which is available to
the protocol (and the permitter, as described in Section 2.7), while in the unsized setting it is not. The
precise details are as follows.
The unsized setting. For the unsized setting, R (and hence T ) is undetermined, with the only restric-
tions being:
1. R will be a function from U × D × M to R≥0 satisfying the requirement that, at all timeslots
in the duration, the total resource balance belongs to a fixed interval [R0,R1], where R0 > 0 is
sufficiently small and R1 > R0 is sufficiently large.
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2. There may also be bounds placed on the resource balance of the adversary.
We shall refer to the set of all resource pools satisfying these restrictions as the possible resource
pools, and, in Section 2.10, we shall define a protocol to be live if it is live for all possible resource
pools.
The sized setting. For the sized setting, the total resource balance T is a predetermined function
T : D×M → R≥0.
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The basic idea is that PoS protocols will generally be best modelled using the sized setting, while
PoW protocols are best modelled using the unsized setting, since one does not know the total resource
balance (e.g., total hashrate in each timeslot) in advance.
2.7 The Permitter Oracle
In order to specify how the resource pool is to be used, we make use of the notion of a permitter
oracle. This is the part of the model that blackboxes user selection, since it is the permitter oracle that
grants permission to broadcast messages. The permitter oracle need not be implemented explicitly in
the blockchain being modelled, and is a mathematical abstraction that allows for the discussion and
comparison of blockchains of very different types. It is designed to be as simple as possible, subject to
this goal.
7We consider resource pools with range restricted to the fixed interval [R0,R1] because it turns out to be an overly strong
condition to require a protocol to be live without any further conditions on the total resource balance, beyond the fact that it is
a function to R≥0. We wish to be able to talk about Bitcoin as live in the unsized setting, for example, but liveness will certainly
fail if R is the constant 0 function, or if the total resource balance decreases sufficiently quickly over time.
8Note that, for PoS protocols to operate in the sized setting, we do not require that the total stake (or how it varies over
time) is predetermined. It is enough that we are given a function determining how the total stake depends on the message state.
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As described in Section 2.2, we consider each user to be a computing device with access to certain
external oracles and functionalities. At any given timeslot t ∈ D, a user’s state is entirely specified by the
set of public keys they control, the input parameters, their message state and the set of permissions they
have been given by the permitter oracle O. The protocol P = (I, O) is then a pair, where the instruction
set I is a set of deterministic and efficiently computable instructions, which specifies precisely what
actions honest users should carry out at each timeslot, as a function of the timeslot and their state at that
timeslot. The instructions of the protocol are therefore a function of the timeslot, the keys controlled by
the user, the input parameters, their message state, and the set of permissions they have been given by
the permitter.
One of the external functionalities each user has is the ability to broadcast valid messages. Amongst
the conditions required for validity is that the public key responsible for the broadcast has been given
permission by the permitter oracle O, which is an oracle to which users have access. We thus suppose
that users can make ‘requests’ to the permitter, of the form (U,M, t′, A), where U is a public key under
their control, M is a possible message state, t′ is a timeslot, and where A is some (possibly empty)
extra data. Given a request of this form, the permitter may then respond by giving them permission to
broadcast certain messages. The response of the permitter to a request (U,M, t′, A) will be assumed to
be a probabilistic function of the protocol’s input parameters, the actual timeslot t, the previous requests
made by U, the tuple (U,M, t′, A), and of the user’s resource balance R(U, t′,M).9
It should be noted that the roles of the resource pool and the permitter are different in the sense that,
while the resource pool is a variable (meaning that a given protocol may be expected to be live and secure
with respect to a range of resource pools), the permitter is part of the protocol description (meaning that
a protocol is only required to run relative to a specific permitter oracle).
So far we haven’t described any conditions requiring that the behaviour of the permitter must be
influenced by the resource pool. Prior to Section 6, the only assumption of this kind that we shall make
is stated below.
No balance, no voice: No U will be given permission to broadcast messages in response to
a request (U,M, t′, A) for which R(U, t′,M) = 0.
2.8 Modelling Simple PoW and PoS Protocols
For concreteness, we next consider how some simple PoS and PoW protocols can be modelled using our
framework. In this section, we will give a brief summary. In Section 7 we give a more in-depth descrip-
tion for Bitcoin. We remind the reader that our goal is not to literally model the step-by-step operation
of these protocols, but rather to replicate the essential properties of their user selection mechanisms with
a suitable choice of a permitter oracle.
First, consider a PoW protocol like Bitcoin. To keep things simple, let us ignore Bitcoin’s adjustable
‘difficulty parameter’ (i.e., how hard the PoW is to produce). To model a simple PoW protocol of this
form, we can consider very short timeslots (say 1 second each, or even shorter). The resource level (i.e.,
hashrate) of a user in a given timeslot is independent of the message state, so we can restrict attention
to resource pools R : U ×D → R≥0. We interpret a user request (U,M, t
′, A) in a timeslot t as all of U’s
9Another way to interpret these conditions is that the response to a request (or the probability distribution on that response)
should be fully determined by information known to the user making the request – in practice, users should be able to check
for themselves whether or not they have permission to broadcast.
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efforts during timeslot t to extend the message state M10 – if a user submits more than one request during
a timeslot, the permitter ignores all but the first. For example, we can interpret A as a choice and ordering
of transactions within a proposed block, along with a choice of predecessor, with the understanding that
the user will try as many different nonces as possible during the timeslot. The permitter then gives U
permission to broadcast with probability proportional to R(U, t) (so long as A can be legally added to
M).11 A notable feature of this permitter is that permission is granted for the broadcast of specific
messages (i.e., a specific choice of A), rather than for a collection of messages meeting certain criteria.
There are various ways in which ‘standard’ PoS selection processes can work. Let us restrict ourselves,
just for now and for the purposes of this example, to considering protocols in which the only broadcast
messages are blocks, and let us consider a longest chain PoS protocol which works as follows: For each
broadcast chain C and for all timeslots in a set T (C), the protocol being modelled selects precisely one
public key who is permitted to produce blocks extending C (i.e. blocks whose parent is the unique leaf
of C), with the probability each public key is chosen being proportional to their wealth as recorded in
C.12 In order to model a protocol of this form, we can consider a (timeslot-independent) resource pool
R : U ×M → R≥0, which takes the longest chain C from M, and allocates to each public key U their
wealth according to C.13 Then we can consider a permitter which chooses one public key U for each
chain C and each timeslot t′ in T (C), each public key U being chosen with probability R(U,C)/T (C).
(This is well defined because the total resource pool T is known to the protocol.) That chosen public
key U corresponding to C and t′, is then given permission to broadcast blocks extending C whenever U
makes a request (U,M, t′, ∅) for which C is the longest chain in M. A notable feature of this permitter is
that the permission it gives is for the broadcast of sets of messages satisfying certain criteria, i.e. when
the permitter gives permission it is for any (otherwise valid) block extending a given chain C.
To model a BFT PoS protocol like Algorand, the basic approach will be very similar to that described
for the longest chain PoS protocol above, except that certain other signed messages might be now re-
quired in M (such as signed votes on blocks) before permission to broadcast is granted, and permission
may now be given for the broadcast of messages other than blocks (such as votes on blocks).
Formalising differences between PoS and PoW. There are at least three differences that can be identi-
fied in the context of our framework, that typically distinguish PoW and PoS protocols:
• PoS protocols are generally best modelled in the sized setting, while PoW protocols operate in the
unsized setting. Being in the sized setting does not mean that how the total stake varies over time
has to be predetermined information available to the protocol ahead of time. All that is required is
knowledge of a function describing how a user’s stake depends upon the message state, and this
is enough to avoid the conclusion of Theorem 3.1, and to allow protocols to be live and secure in
the partially synchronous setting.
10The parameter t′ is automatically interpreted as the current timeslot t; the parameter t′ is relevant only for PoS protocols.
11I.e., with probability R(U, t)/M, where M is a large constant that depends on an assumed upper bound on hashrate and
the timeslot length.
12Note that being permitted to broadcast a block is not the same as being instructed by the protocol to broadcast a block,
and does not determine how other users will treat the block – there are many contexts in which users might be able to produce
valid blocks for which broadcast is not instructed by the protocol (e.g., a block extending a chain other than the longest one).
A user may also be permitted to produce two valid blocks whose broadcast constitutes an overt deviation from the protocol,
and which might be punished.
13Note that in many PoS protocols the relevant balance is actually U’s wealth according to some proper initial segment of
C, and that in modelling such protocols one should adjust R accordingly. As mentioned earlier, it is also standard to insist that
U has been recorded as a public key with non-zero stake for a minimum number of timeslots.
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• For PoS protocols, blocks cannot lie about their corresponding timeslot. More formally, for each
broadcast message m, there exists a unique timeslot tm such that permission to broadcast m was
given in response to some request (U, tm,M, A), and tm is computable from m. We will define this
later as being the conditions required for the timed setting.
• PoS protocols are multi-permitters. This means that, when permission is given to broadcast, it is
in response to a request (U,M, t′, ∅) in which the last entry is empty. The resultant set of permitted
broadcasts must therefore be a function of the first three entries, which will often mean in practice
that permission has to be granted for a large set of possible broadcasts, such as all blocks extending
a given chain in M. In a PoW protocol, on the other hand, permission to broadcast is made in
response to a request (U,M, t′, A), where A can specify a certain block, and the resultant permission
can be block specific.
It is a significant task for future research to further explore the consequences of these differences. Can
properties such as these be used to define the classes of PoW and PoS protocols?
2.9 The Extended Protocol and the Meaning of Probabilistic Statements
In order to define what it means for a protocol to be secure or live, we first need a notion of confirmation
for blocks. This is a function C mapping any message state to a chain that is a subset of that message
state, in a manner that depends on the protocol input parameters, including a parameter ε > 0 called
the security parameter. The intuition behind ε is that it should upper bound the probability of false
confirmation. Given any message state, C returns the set of confirmed blocks.
In Section 2.7, we stipulated that the protocol P = (I, O) is a pair, where the instruction set I is a
set of deterministic and efficiently computable instructions specifying precisely what actions an honest
user should carry out at each timeslot, and where O is the permitter. In general, however, a protocol
might only be considered to run relative to a specific notion of confirmation C. We will refer to the triple
(I, O, C) as the extended protocol. Often we shall suppress explicit mention of C, and assume it to be
implicitly attached to a given protocol. We shall talk about a protocol being live, for example, when it is
really the extended protocol to which the definition applies. It is important to understand, however, that
the notion of confirmation C is separate from P, and does not impact the instructions of the protocol. In
principle, one can run the same Bitcoin protocol relative to a range of different notions of confirmation.
While the set of confirmed blocks might depend on C, the instructions of the protocol do not.
An execution of the extended protocol will depend on the message delivery rule: A message delivery
rule is a partial function d which maps any tuple (U,m, t,U′), such that U is a public key, m is a possible
message, t is a timeslot in the duration, and U′ is a user, to a timeslot t′ ≥ t. So a fixed message
delivery rule determines when each message m, broadcast by U at timeslot t, will be delivered to each
user U′.14 We restrict attention to message delivery rules which are consistent with ∆ (see Section 2.3),
the set of synchronous and asynchronous intervals and the adversary, and which satisfy the condition
that d(U,m, t,U′) = t whenever U is a public key controlled by U′.
Each execution of the extended protocol is then entirely determined by:
(I1) The input parameters;
14Note that a single message delivery rule might result in many different sequences of message deliveries, if different
sequences of messages are broadcast. Note also that messages are broadcast by keys but delivered to users.
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(I2) The set of users and their public keys;
(I3) An index specifying the program executed by the adversary;
(I4) The resource pool (which may or may not be undetermined);
(I5) The message delivery rule;
(I6) The probabilistic responses of the permitter.
With respect to the extended protocol (I, O, C), we call a particular set of choices for (I1)- (I5) a
protocol instance. Generally, when we discuss an extended protocol, we shall do so within the context
of a setting, which constrains the set of possible protocol instances. The setting might restrict the set of
resource pools to those in which the adversary is given a limited resource balance, for example. When
we make a probabilistic statement to the effect that a certain condition holds with at most/least a certain
probability, this means that the probabilisitic bound holds for all protocol instances consistent with the
setting.
Where convenient, we may also refer to the pair (P, C) as the extended protocol, where P = (I, O).
2.10 Defining Liveness
There are a number of papers that successfully describe liveness and security notions for blockchain
protocols, see for example [PSS17, GKL18, KRS18]. Our interest here is in identifying the simplest
definitions that suffice to express our later results. Consider a protocol with a notion of confirmation C,
and let |C(M)| denote the number of blocks in C(M) for any message state M. For timeslots t1 < t2, let
l1 be the maximum value |C(M1)| for any M1 which is a message state of any user at any timeslot t ≤ t1,
and let l2 be the minimum value |C(M2)| for any M2 which is a message state of any user at timeslot t2.
We say that [t1, t2] is a growth interval if l2 > l1. For any duration D, let |D| be the number of timeslots
in D. For ℓε,D which takes values in N depending on ε and D, let us say that ℓε,D is sublinear in D if,
for each ε > 0 and each α ∈ (0, 1), ℓε,D < α|D| for all sufficiently large values of |D| (the motivation for
considering sublinearity will be described shortly).
Definition 2.1. A protocol is live if, for every choice of security parameter ε > 0 and duration D, there
exists ℓε,D, which is sublinear in D, and such that for each pair of timeslots t1 < t2 ∈ D the following
holds with probability at least 1 − ε: If t2 − t1 ≥ ℓε,D and [t1, t2] is entirely synchronous, then [t1, t2] is a
growth interval.
So, roughly speaking, a protocol is live if the number of confirmed blocks can be relied on to grow
over time during synchronous intervals of sufficient length. The reason we require ℓε,D, to be sublinear
in D is so that the number of confirmed blocks likely increases with sufficient increase in synchronous
duration. For example, a protocol that confirms a block with probability only 2−|D| at each timeslot
should not be considered live.
Generally, assertions of liveness and security will be made within the confines of a particular setting,
which might limit the resource balance of the adversary or specify a minimum number of active users
for each timeslot, for example. Note also, that while Definition 2.1 only refers explicitly to protocols, it
is really the extended protocol to which the definition applies. The following stronger notion will also
be useful.
14
Definition 2.2. A protocol is uniformly live if, for every choice of security parameter ε > 0 and duration
D, there exists ℓε,D, which is sublinear in D, and such that the following holds with probability at least
1 − ε: For all pairs of timeslots t1 < t2 ∈ D, if t2 − t1 ≥ ℓε,D and [t1, t2] is entirely synchronous, then
[t1, t2] is a growth interval.
So the difference between being live and uniformly live is that the latter definition requires that, with
probability at least 1 − ε, all appropriate intervals are growth intervals. The former definition only
requires the probabilistic bound to hold for each interval individually. An initial impression might be
that it should follow from the Union Bound that Definitions 2.1 and 2.2 are essentially equivalent. This
is not so. Firstly, this is because the protocol and notion of confirmation take the security parameter ε
as input. Nevertheless, one might think that if a protocol is live then a ‘recalibration’, which takes some
appropriate transformation of the security parameter as input, should necessarily be uniformly live. This
does not follow (in part) because there is no guarantee that the resulting ℓε,D will be sublinear in D –
see Section 5 for a detailed analysis.
Definition 2.3. We define a protocol to be adaptive if it is live in the unsized setting.
2.11 Defining Security
Roughly speaking, security requires that confirmed blocks normally belong to the same chain. Let us
say that two distinct blocks are incompatible if neither is an ancestor of the other, and are compatible
otherwise. If B ∈ C(M) where M is the message state of user U at time t, then we shall say that B is
confirmed for U at t.
Definition 2.4 (Security). A protocol is secure if the following holds for every choice of security pa-
rameter ε > 0, for every U1,U2 and for all timeslots t1, t2 in the duration: With probability > 1 − ε, all
blocks which are confirmed for U1 at t1 are compatible with all those which are confirmed for U2 at t2.
The following stronger notion will also be useful.
Definition 2.5 (Uniform Security). A protocol is uniformly secure if the following holds for every choice
of security parameter ε > 0: With probability > 1 − ε, there do not exist incompatible blocks B1, B2,
timeslots t1, t2 and U1,U2 such that Bi is confirmed for Ui at ti for i ∈ {1, 2}.
So the difference between security and uniform security is that the latter requires the probability of
even a single disagreement to be bounded, while the former only bounds the probability of disagreement
for each pair of users at each timeslot pair. Just as for liveness and uniform liveness, it does not follow
from the Union Bound that security is essentially equivalent to uniform security. In Section 5 we will
perform a detailed analysis of the relationship between these notions.
Definition 2.6. A protocol is partition secure if it is secure in the partially synchronous setting. A
protocol is uniformly partition secure if it is uniformly secure in the partially synchronous setting.
Note that BFT protocols such as Algorand are normally designed to be partition secure.
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3 The Impossibility of being Adaptive and Partition Secure
Now that the framework and all required definitions are in place, we can formally prove Theorem 3.1.
Theorem 3.1. No protocol is both adaptive and partition secure.
As stated previously, this theorem can be seen as an analogue of the CAP Theorem [GL02] from
distributed computing for our framework. Now that we have formally defined adaptivity, security, and
liveness, it may be useful to say a little more about the relationship to the CAP Theorem. While the CAP
Theorem asserts that (under the threat of unbounded network partitions), no protocol can be both avail-
able and consistent, it is possible for BFT protocols such as Algorand to be both live and secure in the
partially synchronous setting. This is possible because liveness is a fundamentally weaker property than
availability: Liveness does not require new confirmed blocks to be produced during extended periods of
asynchrony. For example, Algorand is live, even though block production may stop during network par-
titions. The key idea behind the proof of Theorem 3.1 is that, in the unsized (and partially synchronous)
setting, this fundamental difference disappears, with network partitions indistinguishable from waning
resource pools. Liveness then forces the existence of growth intervals during network partitions. In
the unsized and partially synchronous setting, security and liveness thus become incompatible, just as
consistency and availability are incompatible according to the CAP Theorem.
Proof. (of Theorem 3.1) The idea behind the proof can be summed up as follows. We consider execu-
tions of the protocol in which there are at least two users, both of which are honest, and who control
public keys U0 and U1 respectively. Suppose that, in an execution of the protocol in the unsized and par-
tially synchronous setting, U0 and U1 both have the same constant and non-zero resource balance, and
that all other users have resource balance zero throughout the duration. According to the assumption
‘no balance, no vote’, this means that U0 and U1 will be the only public keys which are able to broadcast
messages. For as long as the adversary is able to prevent messages broadcast by each Ui from being
delivered to U1−i (i ∈ {0, 1}), the execution will be indistinguishable, as far as Ui is concerned, from one
in which only Ui has the same constant and non-zero resource balance. The fact that the protocol is
live means that, with high probability, U0 and U1 will see confirmed blocks within a bounded period of
time. The confirmed blocks for U0 will be incompatible with those for U1, so long as these confirmed
blocks appear before any point at which a message broadcast by Ui has been delivered to U1−i for some
i ∈ {0, 1}. This contradicts security for the protocol in the partially synchronous setting.
To describe the argument in more detail, let U0 and U1 be public keys controlled by different honest
users. For a duration D which is sufficiently long, we consider three different resource pools:
R0 : We let R0 assign the constant value R > 0 to both U0 and U1 over the entire duration, while all
other users are assigned the constant value 0.
R1 : We let R1 assign the constant value R to U0 over the entire duration, while all other users are
assigned the constant value 0.
R2 : We let R2 assign the constant value R to U1 over the entire duration, while all other users are
assigned the constant value 0.
We consider three different instances of the protocol with the same parameters, for the unsized setting
in which the resource pool is an undetermined variable:
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In0 : Here R := R0. All timeslots are asynchronous and the adversary prevents the delivery of messages
broadcast by Ui to the user controlling U1−i, for i ∈ {0, 1}.
In1 : Here R := R1, and we work in the synchronous setting (or in the partially synchronous setting,
but without interference by the adversary).
In2 : Here R := R2, and we work in the synchronous setting.
According to the assumption of ‘no balance, no voice’, it follows that only U0 and U1 will be able to
broadcast messages in any of these three instances. Our framework stipulates that the instructions of the
protocol for a given user at a given timeslot must be a deterministic function of the protocol parameters,
the timeslot, the keys controlled by the user, their message state and the set of permissions they have
been given by the permitter (see Section 2.7). It also stipulates that the response of the permitter to a
request (U,M, t′, A) is a probabilistic function of the protocol parameters, the actual timeslot t, previous
requests made by U, the request (U,M, t′, A), and the user’s resource level R(U, t′,M). It therefore follows
by induction on timeslots that, because the resource pool is undetermined:
(†) For each i ∈ {0, 1}, and for all timeslots in In0, the probability distribution on the state of the user
controlling Ui is identical to the corresponding distribution at the same timeslot in In1+i.
If the protocol is adaptive, then it follows from Definition 2.1 that we can find a timeslot t0 satisfying
the following condition: In both In1+i (i ∈ {0, 1}), it holds with probability > 3/4 that there is at least
one block which is confirmed for Ui at t0. By (†) it then holds for In0, and for each i ∈ {0, 1}, that with
probability > 3/4 there is at least one block which is confirmed for Ui at t0. We stipulated in Section
2.4 that no block B can be broadcast by U := Miner(B) at a point strictly prior to that at which its
parent has been delivered to U. It follows that in In0 all blocks which are confirmed for Ui must be
incompatible with all blocks which are confirmed for U1−i. The definition of security therefore fails to
hold for timeslot t0, and with respect to the security parameter 1/2. 
4 Certificates in the Partially Synchronous Setting
The rough idea is that ‘certificates’ should be proofs of confirmation. Towards formalising this idea, let
us first consider a version which is too weak.
Definition 4.1. If B ∈ C(M) then we shall refer to M as a subjective certificate for B.
Wewill say that a set of messages M is broadcast if every member is broadcast, and that M is broadcast
by timeslot t if every member of M is broadcast at a timeslot ≤ t (different members potentially being
broadcast at different timeslots). If M is a subjective certificate for B, then there might exist M′ ⊃ M
for which B < C(M′). So the fact that M is broadcast does not constitute proof that C is confirmed with
respect to any user (unless you are that user and you also know that M is your entire message state).
When do we get harder forms of proof than subjective certificates? Definition 4.2 below gives a natural
and very simple way of formalising this.
Definition 4.2. We say that a protocol with a notion of confirmation C produces certificates if the
following holds with probability > 1 − ε when the protocol is run with security parameter ε: There
do not exist incompatible blocks B1, B2, a timeslot t and M1,M2 which are broadcast by t, such that
Bi ∈ C(Mi) for i ∈ {1, 2}.
17
It is important to stress that, in the definition above, the Mi are not necessarily the message states of
any user, but are rather arbitrary subsets of the set of all broadcast messages. The basic idea is that, if
a protocol produces certificates, then subjective certificates constitute proof of confirmation. Algorand
is an example of a protocol which produces certificates: The protocol is designed so that it is unlikely
that two incompatible blocks will be produced at any point in the duration together with appropriate
committee signatures verifying confirmation for each.
Our next aim is to show that, in the partially synchronous setting, producing certificates is equivalent
to security. In fact, producing certificates is clearly at least as strong as uniform security, so it suffices to
show that if a protocol is secure then it must produce certificates.
Theorem 4.1. If a protocol is partition secure then it produces certificates.
Proof. Towards a contradiction, suppose that the protocol with notion of confirmation C is secure in the
partially synchronous setting, but that there exists a protocol instance15 In1 with security parameter ε,
such that the following holds with probability ≥ ε: There exist incompatible blocks B1, B2, a timeslot t
and M1,M2 which are broadcast by t, such that Bi ∈ C(Mi) for i ∈ {1, 2}. This means that the following
holds with probability ≥ ε for tlast, which is the last timeslot in the duration: There exist incompatible
blocks B1, B2 and M1,M2 which are broadcast by tlast, such that Bi ∈ C(Mi) for i ∈ {1, 2}.
Consider the protocol instance In2 which has the same parameters as In1, the same adversary, and the
same set of users who are active at the same set of timeslots with the same set of public keys, except that
now there are two extra users U1 and U2, who are active at all timeslots with keys U1 and U2 respectively.
Suppose that the resource pool for In2 is the same as that for In1 when restricted to public keys other
than U1 and U2, and that U1 and U2 have zero resource balance throughout the duration. Suppose further
that the message delivery rule for In2 is the same as that for In1 when restricted to tuples (U,m, t,U
′)
such that U < {U1, U2} and U
′
< {U1,U2}, but that now all timeslots are asynchronous (we can suppose
that the adversary is such that this message delivery rule is still consistent with the adversary, even when
all timeslots are asynchronous). Our framework stipulates that the instructions of the protocol for a given
user at a given timeslot must be a deterministic function of the protocol parameters, the timeslot, the
keys controlled by the user, their message state and the set of permissions they have been given by the
permitter (see Section 2.7). It also stipulates that the response of the permitter to a request (U,M, t′, A)
is a probabilistic function of the input parameters, the actual timeslot t, previous requests made by U,
the request (U,M, t′, A), and the user’s resource level R(U, t′,M). From the assumption ‘No balance,
no voice’, it therefore follows by induction on timeslots that the probability distribution on the set of
broadcast messages is the same at each timeslot for In2 as for In1, independent of which deliveries
the adversary chooses to make to U1 and U2. It therefore holds for the protocol instance In2 that with
probability ≥ ε there exist incompatible blocks B1, B2, and M1,M2 which are broadcast by tlast, such
that Bi ∈ C(Mi) for i ∈ {1, 2}. Suppose that the adversary withholds all messages from U1 and U2 until
tlast, and then delivers M1 and M2 (if they exist) to U1 and U2 respectively. This suffices to demonstrate
that the definition of security is violated with respect to tlast, ε, U1 and U2. 
Corollary 4.3. Security and uniform security are equivalent in the partially synchronous setting.
15See Section 2.9 for the definition of a protocol instance.
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Proof. This follows from Theorem 4.1 and the fact that producing certificates clearly implies uniform
security. 
5 Defining Recalibrations
Theorem 4.1 presents a rather tidy picture for the partially synchronous setting. It is not difficult to see,
however, that security and uniform security will not be equivalent in the synchronous setting. To see
this, we can consider the example of Bitcoin. Suppose that we operate in the standard way for Bitcoin,
and use a notion of confirmation C that depends only on the security parameter ε, and not on the duration
D. In this case, the protocol is secure in the synchronous setting, but will not be uniformly secure in a
setting where the adversary controls a non-zero amount of mining power: If a fixed number of blocks
are required for confirmation then, given enough time, the adversary will eventually complete a double
spend. It is also clear, however, how to ‘recalibrate’ the protocol to deal with different durations – to
make the protocol uniformly secure, the number of blocks required for confirmation should be a function
of both ε and D.
The aim of this section is formalise the idea of recalibration and to show that, if a protocol is secure,
then (under fairly weak conditions) a recalibration will be uniformly secure. The basic idea is very
simple – one runs the initial (unrecalibrated) protocol for smaller values of ε as the duration increases,
but one has to be careful that the resulting ℓε,D is sublinear in D.
Definition 5.1. We shall say (P2, C2) is a recalibration of the extended protocol (P1, C1) if running P2
given certain input parameters means running P1 for a computable transformation of those parameters,
and then terminating after |D| many steps are complete.
So if running P2 with security parameter ε and for n many timeslots means running P1 with input
parameters that specify a security parameter ε/10 and that specify a duration consisting of 2n many
timeslots, and then terminating after n many timeslots have been completed, then we might describe
P2 as a recalibration of P1.
16 Note also, that we allow the recalibration to use a different notion of
confirmation.
In the following, we shall say that ℓε,D is independent ofD if ℓε,D = ℓε,D′ for all ε > 0 and all D,D
′.
When ℓε,D is independent of D, we shall often write ℓε for ℓε,D.
Definition 5.2. In the bounded user setting we assume that there is a finite upper bound on the number
of users, which holds for all protocol instances.17
Proposition 5.3. Consider the synchronous and bounded user setting. Suppose P satisfies liveness with
respect to ℓε,D, that ℓε,D is independent of D, and that for each α > 0, ℓε < αε
−1 for all sufficiently
small ε > 0. If P is secure, there exists a recalibration of P that is uniformly live and uniformly secure.
The conditions on ℓε,D in the statement of Proposition 5.3 can reasonably be regarded as weak, because
existing protocols which are not already uniformly secure will normally satisfy the conditions that:
16The reader might wonder why one should specify a duration of 2n timeslots and then terminate after n many. This is
because the instructions of the first n timesteps can depend on the intended duration. In Algorand, committee sizes will depend
on the intended duration, for example.
17Note that the requirement here is that the number of users is bounded, rather than the number of public keys.
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(†a) ℓε,D is independent ofD, and;
(†b) For some constant c and any ε ∈ (0, 1), we have ℓε < cln
1
ε
.
The example of Bitcoin might be useful for the purposes of illustration here. Bitcoin is secure in the
synchronous setting, and the number of blocks required for confirmation is normally considered to be
independent of the duration. The number of blocks required for confirmation does depend on how sure
one needs to be that an adversary cannot double spend in any given time interval, but it’s also true that
an adversary’s chance of double spending in a given time interval decreases exponentially in the number
of blocks required for confirmation as well. So Bitcoin is an example of a protocol satisfying (†a) and
(†b) above.
Proof of Proposition 5.3. It is useful to consider a security notion that is intermediate between security
and uniform security. For the purposes of the following definition, we shall say that a block is confirmed
at timeslot t if there exists at least one user for whom that is the case.
Definition 5.4 (Timeslot Security). A protocol is timeslot secure if the following holds for every choice
of security parameter ε > 0, and for all timeslots t1, t2 in the duration: With probability > 1 − ε, all
blocks which are confirmed at t1 are compatible with all blocks which are confirmed at t2.
So the difference between timeslot security and uniform security is that the latter requires the prob-
ability of even a single disagreement to be bounded, while the former only bounds the probability of
disagreement for each pair of timeslots. Similarly, the difference between security and timeslot security
is that, for each pair of timeslots, the latter requires the probability of even a single disagreement to be
bounded, while the former only bounds the probability of disagreement for each pair of users at that
timeslot pair.
Now suppose P is live and secure, and that the conditions of Proposition 5.3 hold. Then it follows
directly from the Union Bound that, if the number of users is bounded, then some recalibration of P
is live and timeslot secure and satisfies the conditions of Proposition 5.3. Since a recalibration of a
recalibration of P is a recalibration of P, our main task is therefore to show that, if P is live and timeslot
secure and the conditions of Proposition 5.3 hold, then there exists a recalibration of P that is uniformly
live and uniformly secure.
So suppose (P, C) is live and timeslot secure, and that the conditions of Proposition 5.3 hold. Suppose
we are given ε0 and D0 as input parameters to our recalibration (P
′, C′). We wish to find an appropriate
security parameter ε1 and a duration D1 ≥ D0 to give as inputs to P and C, so that uniform security is
satisfied with respect to ε0 andD0 if we run P with inputs ε1 andD1 and then terminate after |D0|many
timeslots. The difficulty is to ensure that ℓε1 remains sublinear in D0. To achieve this, let n := |D0|,
set ε1 := ε0/2n and choose |D1| > n + ℓε1 , so that D0 is the first n timeslots in D1. This defines the
recalibration. It remains to establish uniform liveness and uniform security.
For uniform liveness we must have that, for each α ∈ (0, 1), ℓε1 < αn for all sufficiently large values
of n – if this condition holds then it follows from the Union Bound that our recalibration will satisfy
uniform liveness (and the required sublinearity inD0) with respect to ℓ
′
ε0,D0
:= ℓε1 . The condition holds
since we are given that for each α > 0, ℓε < αε
−1 for all sufficiently small ε > 0. Suppose given α > 0,
and put α′ := αε0/2. Then we have that, for all sufficiently large n:
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ℓε1 < α
′(ε0/2n)
−1 = αn.
Next we must show that the conditions for uniform security are satisfied. Suppose P is given inputs ε1
andD1 and is actually run for |D1|many timeslots. We aim to show that, with probability > 1−ε0, there
do not exist incompatible blocks B1, B2, timeslots t1, t2 ∈ D0 and U1,U2 such that Bi is confirmed for
Ui at ti for i ∈ {1, 2}. Let tlast be the last timeslot of the duration D1 and define t
∗ := tlast − ℓε1 . The basic
idea is that the two following conditions hold with high probability: (i) [t∗, tlast] is a growth interval, and
(b) There does not exist t1 ∈ D0, users U1,U2 and incompatible blocks B1, B2, such that B1 is confirmed
for U1 at t1 and B2 is confirmed for U2 at tlast. When both these conditions hold, and since t
∗ > n, this
suffices to show that no incompatible and confirmed blocks exist during the duration D0. Now let us see
that in more detail.
By the choice ofD1, t
∗ > n. It follows from the definition of liveness that (‡1) below fails to hold with
probability ≤ ε1:
(‡1) [t
∗, tlast] is a growth interval.
Note that, so long as (‡1) holds, every user has more confirmed blocks at tlast than any user does at
any timeslot in D0. It also follows from the Union Bound, and the definition of liveness and timeslot
security, that (‡2) below fails to hold with probability ≤ nε1 = ε0/2:
(‡2) There does not exist t1 ∈ D0, users U1,U2 and incompatible blocks B1, B2, such that B1 is con-
firmed for U1 at t1 and B2 is confirmed for U2 at tlast.
Now note that:
(a) If (‡1) and (‡2) both hold, then there do not exist incompatible blocks B1, B2, timeslots t1, t2 ∈ D0
and U1,U2 such that Bi is confirmed for Ui at ti for i ∈ {1, 2}.
(b) With probability > 1 − ε1 − ε0/2 ≥ 1 − ε0, (‡1) and (‡2) both hold.
So uniform security is satisfied with respect to ε0 and D0, as required. 
Definition 5.5. We say P has standard functionality if it is uniformly live and uniformly secure. We say
that a recalibration of P is faithful if it has standard functionality when P does.
Proposition 5.3 justifies concentrating on protocols which have standard functionality where it is
convenient to do so, since protocols which are live and secure will have recalibrations with standard
functionality, so long as the rather weak conditions of Proposition 5.3 are satisfied. Again, when we talk
about the security and liveness of a protocol, it is really the extended protocol that we are referring to.
6 Certificates in the Synchronous Setting
6.1 The Synchronous and Unsized Setting
As outlined in the introduction, one aim of this paper is to give a positive answer to Q3, by showing that
whether a protocol produces certificates comes down essentially to properties of the user selection pro-
cess: In the unsized setting protocols cannot produce certificates, while in the sized setting, recalibrated
protocols will automatically produce certificates, at least if they are of ‘standard form’. For the partially
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synchronous setting, the results of Sections 3 and 4 already bear this out – the sized setting is required
for security and all secure protocols must produce certificates. The following theorem now deals with
the unsized and synchronous setting. Recall that, in the unsized setting, the total resource balance be-
longs to a fixed interval [R0,R1]. We say that the protocol operates ‘in the presence of a non-trivial
adversary’ if the setting allows that the adversary may have resource balance at least R0 throughout the
duration.
Theorem 6.1. Consider the synchronous and unsized setting. If a protocol is live then, in the presence
of a non-trivial adversary, it does not produce certificates.
Proof. The basic idea is that the adversary with resource balance at least R0 can ‘simulate’ their own
execution of the protocol, in which only they have non-zero resource balance, while honest users carry
out an execution in which the adversary does not participate. Simulating their own execution means
that the adversary carries out the protocol as usual, while ignoring messages broadcast by honest users,
but does not initially broadcast messages when given permission to do so. Liveness (together with the
fact that the resource pool is undetermined) guarantees that, with high probability, both the actual and
simulated executions produce blocks which look confirmed from their own perspective. These blocks
will be incompatible with each other, and (once the adversary finally broadcasts the messages that they
have been given permission for), these blocks will all have subjective certificates which are subsets of
the set of broadcast messages. This suffices to show that the protocol does not produce certificates.
More precisely, we consider two instances of the protocol In0 and In1 in the synchronous and unsized
setting, which have the same parameters, including the same small security parameter ε, the same long
duration D, the same set of users and the same message delivery rule, but which differ as follows:
• In In0 a set of users U0 control public keys in a set U0, which are the only public keys that do
not have zero resource balance throughout the duration. The total resource balance T has a fixed
value, R0 say.
• In In1 it is the adversary who controls the public keys in U0, and those keys have the same
resource balance throughout the duration as they do in In0. Now, however, another set of honest
users U1 control public keys in a setU1 (disjoint fromU0), and the public keys in U1 have total
resource balance R ≥ R0 throughout the duration, i.e. the resource balances of these keys always
add to R.
In In1, we suppose that the adversary simulates the users in U0 for In0, which means that the adversary
carries out the instructions for those users, with the two following exceptions. Until a certain timeslot
t∗, to be detailed subsequently, they:
(a) Ignore all messages broadcast by honest users, and;
(b) Do not actually broadcast messages when permitted, but consider them delivered to the simulated
users in U0 as per the message delivery rule.
For In0 (so long as the duration is sufficiently long), liveness guarantees the existence of a timeslot t0
for which the following holds with probability > 1 − ε:
(▽0) At t0 there exists a set of broadcast messages M0 and a block B0 such that B0 ∈ C(M0).
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For In1, liveness guarantees the existence of a timeslot t1 for which the following holds with probability
> 1 − ε:
(▽1) At t1 there exists a set of broadcast messages M1 and a block B1 such that B1 ∈ C(M1).
Choose t∗ > t0, t1. Our framework stipulates that the instructions of the protocol for a given user at a
given timeslot must be a deterministic function of the input parameters, the timeslot, the keys controlled
by the user, their message state and the set of permissions they have been given by the permitter (see
Section 2.7). It also stipulates that the response of the permitter to a request (U,M, t′, A) is a probabilistic
function of the protocol input parameters, the actual timeslot t, previous requests made by U, the request
(U,M, t′, A), and the resource level R(U, t′,M). Since we are working in the unsized setting, In1 and In0
have the same input parameters. It therefore follows by induction on timeslots t ≤ t∗, that the following
is true at all points until the end of timeslot t:
(▽2) The probability distribution for In0 on the set of permissions given by the permitter is identical
to the probability distribution for In1 on the set of permissions given by the permitter to the
adversary.
Now suppose that at timeslot t∗ the adversary broadcasts all messages for which they have been given
permission by the permitter. Note that, according to the assumptions of Section 2.4, any block B0
broadcast by the adversary at t∗ will be incompatible with any block B1 that has been broadcast by any
honest user up to that point. Combining (▽0), (▽1) and (▽2), we see that (so long as ε is sufficiently
small that ε < 1 − 2ε) the following holds with probability > ε for t∗ and In1: There exist incompatible
blocks B0, B1, and M0,M1 which are broadcast by the end of t
∗, such that Bi ∈ C(Mi) for i ∈ {0, 1}. This
suffices to show that the protocol does not produce certificates. 
6.2 The Synchronous and Sized Setting
The Example of Sized Bitcoin. Our aim in this subsection is to show that, if we work in the synchronous
and sized setting, and if a protocol is of ‘standard form’, then a recalibration will produce certificates.
To make this precise, however, it will be necessary to recognise the potentially time dependent nature
of proofs of confirmation. To explain this idea, it is instructive to consider the example of Bitcoin in
the sized setting: The protocol is Bitcoin, but now we are told in advance precisely how the hash rate
capability of the network varies over time, as well as bounds on the hash rate of the adversary.18 Tomake
things concrete, let us suppose that the total hash rate is fixed over time, and that the adversary has 10%
of the hash rate at all times. Suppose that, during the first couple of hours of running the protocol, the
difficulty setting is such that the network as a whole (with the adversary acting honestly) will produce
an expected one block every 10 minutes. Suppose further that, after a couple of hours, we see a block B
which belongs to a chain C, in which it is followed by 10 blocks. In this case, the constraints we have
been given mean that it is very unlikely that B does not belong to the longest chain. So, at that timeslot,
C might be considered a proof of confirmation for B, i.e. the existence of the chain C can be taken as
proof that B is confirmed. The nature of this proof is time dependent, however. The same set of blocks
a large number of timeslots later would not constitute proof of confirmation.
If we now consider a PoS version of the example above, modified to work for Snow White rather than
Bitcoin, then the proof produced will not be time dependent. This is because PoS protocols are timed,
18Normally we think of PoW protocols as operating in the unsized setting, precisely because such guarantees on the hash
rate are not realistic.
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i.e. when permission is given to broadcast m in response to a request (U, t,M, A), other users are able to
determine t from m. This is another fundamental distinction between PoW and PoS protocols.
Definition 6.1. We shall refer to the setting as being timed if both of the following hold:
• For each broadcast message m, there exists a unique timeslot tm such that permission to broadcast
m was given in response to some request (U, tm,M, A).
• tm is computable from m.
In order to prove that (recalibrated) protocols in the sized setting produce certificates, we shall have to
make the assumption that we are also working in the timed setting.
Protocols in Standard Form. The basic intuition behind the production of certificates in the sized
setting can be seen from the example of “Sized Bitcoin” above. Once a block is confirmed, honest users
will work ‘above’ this block. So long as those honest users possess a majority of the total resource
balance, and so long as the permitter reflects this fact in the permissions it gives, then those honest
users will broadcast a set of messages which suffices (by its existence rather than the fact that it is
the full message state of any user) to give proof of confirmation. This proof of confirmation might be
temporary, but it will not be temporary in the timed setting.
This intuitive argument, however, assumes that the protocol satisfies certain standard properties. As
alluded to above, there is an assumption that the set of messages broadcast by a group of users will
reflect their resource balances and that the adversary will have a minority resource balance. There is
also an assumption that broadcast messages will (in some sense) point to a particular position on the
blockchain. So we will have to formalise these ideas, and the results we prove will only hold modulo
the assumption that these standard properties are satisfied.
First, let us formalise the idea that messages always point to a position on the blockchain.
Definition 6.2. We shall say that a protocol is in standard form if it satisfies all of the following:
• The protocol has standard functionality (see Definition 5.5).
• Every broadcast message is ‘attached’ to a specific block (blocks being attached to themselves).
• While B is confirmed for U, the instruction set I will only instruct U to broadcast messages which
are attached to B or descendants of B.
Reflecting the Resource Pool. Now let us try to describe how the permitter might reflect the resource
pool. We’ll need a simple way to say that one set of users consistently has a higher resource balance
than another.
Definition 6.3. For Θ > 1, we say a set of public keys U1 dominates another set U2, denoted U1 >Θ
U2, if the following holds for all sets of broadcast messages M and all timeslots t:
∑
U∈U1
R(U, t,M) > Θ ·
∑
U∈U2
R(U, t,M).
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Next, we will need to formalise the idea that, if one set of keys dominates another, then they will be
able to broadcast discernibly different sets of messages. Recall that, in the timed setting, each message
m corresponds to a timeslot tm, which can be determined from m. We shall writeM[t1, t2] to denote the
set {M| ∀m ∈ M, tm ∈ [t1, t2]}. We will say that the set of keys U0 is directed to broadcast M if, for
every m ∈ M, there is some member of U0 that is given permission to broadcast m and is directed to
broadcast m by the protocol. We will say that U0 is able to broadcast M if, for every m ∈ M, there is
some member ofU0 that is given permission to broadcast m. We defineM
∗ := {M| M is finite}. We let
T be the set of functions T : D ×M → R≥0 (so that the total resource balance T ∈ T). We say that
a set of keys U0 has total resource balance T : D ×M → R≥0 if T (t,M) =
∑
U∈U0
R(U, t,M). In the
definition below, we shall say r is sublinear in |D| if, for each Θ, ε, T , and for every α ∈ (0, 1), it holds
that r(Θ, ε, T, |D|) < α|D| for all sufficiently large |D|.
Definition 6.4. We say that (I, O, C) reflects the resource pool if there exist computable finite valued
functions r : R>1 × R>0 × T × N→ N and X : R>1 × R>0 × T × N→ 2
M∗ , such that:
1. r is sublinear in |D|.
2. If U1 ∪ U2 has total resource balance T , and if U1 >Θ U2, then, when P is run with se-
curity parameter ε and for |D| many timeslots, the following holds with probability > 1 − ε:
For all intervals of timeslots [t1, t2] with t2 − t1 ≥ r(Θ, ε, T, |D|), there exists some element of
X(Θ, ε, T, |D|) ∩ M[t1, t2] which U1 is directed to broadcast, while U2 is not able to broadcast
any element of X(Θ, ε, T, |D|) ∩M[t1, t2].
So in Definition 6.4, r specifies a number of timeslots. Then X specifies certain sets of messages M
such that, ifU1 >Θ U2 andU1∪U2 has total resource balance T , thenU1 can be expected to broadcast
one of these sets M in any interval of sufficient length (i.e. the length specified by r). To make this
interesting, we also have that U2 can be expected not to make such broadcasts. To see why this is a
natural and reasonable condition to assume, it is instructive to consider the example of Sized Bitcoin.
Suppose that in some execution the honest users always have at least 60% of the mining power. Then,
over any long period of time r, we can be fairly sure that honest users will get to make at least 50%
of the expected number of block broadcasts,19 while the adversary is unlikely to be able to make such
broadcasts if r is large enough. In fact, the exponentially fast convergence for the law of large numbers
guaranteed by bounds like Hoeffding’s inequality, means r only needs to grow with ln 1/p, where p
is the probability of error (i.e. the probability these conditions on the block broadcasts don’t hold in a
given interval). It’s therefore easy to see that Sized Bitcoin would reflect the resource pool if it could be
implemented in a timed setting. Similar arguments can be made for all well known PoS protocols, and
these are implemented in the timed setting.
Definition 6.5. In the bounded adversary setting it is assumed that:
(i) U1 >Θ U2 for some predetermined input parameter Θ > 1, whereU1 is the set of keys controlled
by honest users, andU2 is the the set of keys controlled by the adversary.
(ii) (I, O, C) reflects the resource pool.
Finally, we can now formalise the idea that under standard conditions, standard protocols in the sized
setting produce certificates.
19Note that this is not the same as 50% of blocks in the longest chain.
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Theorem 6.2. Consider the timed, bounded adversary and sized setting. If P is in standard form, then
there exists a faithful recalibration that produces certificates.
Proof. To define our recalibration (P′, C′), suppose we are given parameters ε,T ,Θ and D. We need
to specify a value ε′ to give as input to P (we will leave other parameters unchanged), and we must
also define C′. Then we need to show that the new extended protocol is uniformly live and produces
certificates.
We define ε′ := ε/4. Towards defining C′, suppose that P satisfies uniform liveness with respect to
ℓε′,D. We divide the duration into intervals of length ℓε′,D, by defining ti := i · (ℓε′,D + r(Θ, ε
′,T , |D|)).
From the definition of uniform liveness we have the following.
($1) With probability > 1 − ε/4 it holds that, for all i with ti ≤ |D|, all users have at least i many
confirmed blocks by the end of timeslot ti.
Now suppose (P, C) satisfies Definition 6.4 with respect to r and X. For each i > 0, define t∗
i
:=
ti + r(Θ, ε
′,T , |D|). Let Ii be the interval [ti, t
∗
i
], and writeM[Ii] to denoteM[ti, t
∗
i
]. LetU1 be the set of
keys controlled by honest users, and letU2 be the the set of keys controlled by the adversary. According
to Definition 6.4, we can then conclude that:
($2) It holds with probability > 1−ε/4 that, whenever Ii is contained in the duration, there exists some
element of X(Θ, ε′,T , |D|) ∩ M[Ii] which U1 is directed to broadcast, while U2 is not able to
broadcast any element of this set.
Since P is uniformly secure, we also know that:
($3) With probability > 1 − ε/4, there do not exist incompatible blocks B1, B2, timeslots t1, t2 and
U1,U2 such that Bi is confirmed for Ui at ti for i ∈ {1, 2}.
So now define X∗(Θ, ε′,T , |D|) to be all those M in X(Θ, ε′,T , |D|) for which there exists i such that
all of the following hold:
(i) Ii ⊆ D.
(ii) M ∈ M[Ii], and;
(iii) For some chain C of length i with leaf B, all messages in M are attached B or its descendants.
Now if M ∈ X∗(Θ, ε′,T , |D|), then let iM be the (unique) i such that (i)–(iii) hold for i and M, let C be
as specified in (iii) for iM, and define C
∗(M) := C. We also define C∗(∅) = ∅. This function C∗ is almost
the notion of confirmation that we want for our recalibration, but the problem is that it is only defined
for very specific values of M. We will use C∗ to help us define C′ that is defined for all possible M.
Combining ($1), ($2) and ($3), and the definition of X
∗, it follows that with probability > 1 − ε both of
the following hold:
1. If M,M′ ∈ X∗(Θ, ε′,T , |D|) are both broadcast, then all blocks in C∗(M) are compatible with all
those in C∗(M′).
2. For every i > 0, there exists M ∈ X∗(Θ, ε′,T , |D|) which is broadcast and such that iM = i.
In order to define C′ for our recalibration, we can then proceed as follows. Given arbitrary M, choose
M′ ⊆ M such that M′ ∈ X∗(Θ, ε′,T , |D|) and iM′ is maximal, or if there exists no M
′ satisfying these
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conditions then define M′ := ∅. We define C′(M) := C∗(M′). It follows from (1) and (2) above that
(P′, C′) produces certificates and satisfies uniform liveness with respect to ℓ′
ε,D
:= ℓε′,D+2r(Θ, ε
′,T , |D|).

7 Reducing to the Permissioned Case
An advantage of our framework is the opportunity it provides for modular analysis, by breaking the
description and evaluation of a permissionless blockchain protocol down into two tasks:
(a) Providing such an analysis for a permissioned reduct, i.e. a probability free and (in a sense to be
clarified) permissioned form of the protocol that we will describe in this section;
(b) Specifying and analysing the properties of an appropriate choice of permitter.
In this section we will define permissioned reducts and show how they can be used to formally describe
this modular approach. The reader may note that for some BFT-inspired PoS protocols such as Algorand
[CM19], this modular approach is already the natural approach taken – to define Algorand one considers
a certain BFT protocol in the permissioned setting, and then considers an appropriate process of user
selection, giving selected users the task of carrying out the BFT protocol. The keen reader may also
note that, even where it is not immediately so obvious what such a modular approach might mean (as
is the case, for example, with Bitcoin), existing proofs of liveness and security do often end up taking
something like a modular approach of this form (even if it is not quite so explicit as for our account
here). It is a benefit of formalising this breakdown through our framework, however, that this reduction
to the permissioned case can be seen to hold much more generally. We hope that describing this general
reduction also helps clarify the relationship between permissionless and permissioned protocols.
After we have defined permissioned reducts, we will consider the example of Bitcoin. Taking the proof
of liveness and security given in [GKL18], we outline how it can be presented in an entirely modular
fashion, in which one first deals with a permissioned reduct for Bitcoin, and then proves that liveness
and security carry over to the permissionless setting.
7.1 Permissioned Reducts
Roughly, we consider a framework which is the same as that in Section 2, except that the permitter and
resource pool are replaced by a deterministic set of rules specifying precisely which keys are allowed to
broadcast and when. In order to make these ideas precise, however, we need a few new definitions.
In Section 2 we specified that the response of the permitter to a request (U,M, t′, A) is a probabilistic
function of the request and: (i) The protocol’s input parameters; (ii) The actual timeslot t; (iii) The
previous requests made by U; (iv) The resource balance R(U, t′,M). This response could be permission
to broadcast any and all messages in a certain set, M′ say. Now consider a pair (U,D), whereU is a set
of keys. A permission table T for the pair is a (deterministic) function that takes any request (U,M, t′, A)
together with values for (i)-(iv) above as input (assuming that U ∈ U and t, t′ ∈ D), and outputs a value
M′ (which could be empty). We will say that the permission table is consistent with O, if whenever
it outputs a value M′, there is always non-zero chance that the permitter O would give permission to
broadcast messages in M′ in response to those same inputs.
So a permission table is a simple object, which can be thought of as a probability free version of the
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permitter. The permission table operates in a permissioned setting, in the sense that the set of keys is
given as an input before the permission table decides who will be given permission to broadcast and
when.
One final note before we define permissioned reducts: We will consider only protocols that are live
and secure, and can therefore assume that ℓε,D has been chosen so as to satisfy Definition 2.1. A
permissioned reduct will be defined relative to this choice of ℓε,D.
7.1.1 Defining Permissioned Reducts for the Protocol P = (I, O).
For a given instance of the protocol, letU0 be the set of all keys controlled by honest users, letU1 be the
set of all keys controlled by the adversary. We consider a framework which is the same as that described
in Section 2, except that, for each execution of the protocol, permission to broadcast is now determined
by a permission table T for (U0∪U1,D) – we shall say that the execution happens relative to T. So now
the permission table is one of the variables determining the instance, and when a user makes a request
(U,M, t′, A) at timeslot t, it is the permission table which dictates the resulting permission to broadcast.
When the execution happens relative to a permission table, we will refer to it as a permissioned execution
– we will expand on the relationship between permissioned executions and the traditional permissioned
setting later.
To define a permissioned reduct PR = (I, T) for P = (I, O), we replace the permitter O with a function
T, which maps each tuple (U0,U1, ε,D), to a set T of permission tables satisfying the conditions that:
(i) All T ∈ T are consistent with O, and;
(ii) The following probability free versions of liveness and security are satisfied for all possible exe-
cutions of the protocol consistent with the setting, so long as U0 is the set of keys controlled by
honest users, U1 is the set of keys controlled by the adversary, and so long as the execution is
relative to some permission table for (U0 ∪U1,D) in T .
Absolute Liveness. For each pair of timeslots t1 < t2 ∈ D, if t2 − t1 ≥ ℓε,D and [t1, t2] is
entirely synchronous, then [t1, t2] is a growth interval.
Absolute Security. For every U1,U2 and for all timeslots t1, t2 in the duration, all blocks
which are confirmed for U1 at t1 are compatible with all those which are confirmed for U2
at t2.
For each choice of ℓε,D there may therefore be many permissioned reducts. It is clear, however, that
for each ℓε,D there exists a single permissioned reduct which is maximal, in the sense that T maps each
tuple (U0,U1, ε,D) to the set of all T for which absolute liveness and absolute security are satisfied,
and which are consistent with O.
The reader might find it useful to think of the permissioned reduct as determining a set of ‘good execu-
tions’, while simultaneously establishing which permissions to broadcast will result in such executions.
While the definition above is quite simple, it may also initially appear a little abstract. An example
will make things clear.
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7.1.2 Defining a Permissioned Reduct for Bitcoin
The model. Before defining the permissioned reduct, we need to decide how we will model Bitcoin
as a protocol P = (I, O). In Section 2.8 we described a simple approach to modelling Bitcoin. Here
we take the same simple approach, but it will be necessary to flesh out the details of the instruction set
somewhat. We will consider a notion of confirmation that makes Bitcoin uniformly live and uniformly
secure in the synchronous setting.
For the sake of concreteness, we fix timeslots of one second each. At each timeslot t, the selected
chain for each user U is the longest chain in their message state – where there is a tie between longest
chains, the selected chain is that which was delivered first, with ties between deliveries at the same
timeslot ordered by least hash.20 At timeslot t, each public key U controlled by U is instructed to put
in a single request (U,M, t, A), where M is U’s message state, and where A specifies a block (without
PoW) extending the selected chain. In response to this request, the permitter may give permission to
broadcast the block. If given permission to broadcast, the instructions dictate that U should then do so
immediately. We work in the synchronous and unsized setting, so that R is undetermined, with the only
restrictions being that:
• R is assumed to be a function fromU ×D to R≥0 satisfying the requirement that, at all timeslots
in the duration, the total resource balance belongs to a fixed interval [R0,R1], where R1 ≥ R0 > 0.
• For some fixed µ > 0, it holds at all timeslots that the adversary controls a proportion at most
0.5 − µ of the total resource balance.21 As in [GKL18], bounds have to be placed on µ that only
allow it to be close to 0 when the ratio between ∆ and the rate at which blocks are produced is
sufficiently small. We shall not worry about achieving optimal values for µ – see [Ren19] for an
excellent account that considers values for µ in more detail.
We suppose we are given two functions Nε,D and ℓ
∗
ε,D
such that:
• Nε,D defines the notion of confirmation C. More precisely, a user considers block B confirmed
once it belongs to their selected chain, and is followed by at least Nε,D many blocks in that chain.
• When the protocol P = (I, O) is run with security parameter ε, it holds with probability at least
1 − ε/2 that: (†0) For every interval of timeslots of length at least ℓ
∗
ε,D
, at least one honest user is
given permission to broadcast a block in that interval.
That appropriate values can be chosen for Nε,D and ℓ
∗
ε,D
has to be shown later as part of the probabilistic
analysis of the behaviour of the permiiter, once we have dealt with the permissioned reduct. It is worth
immediately understanding the relevance of ℓ∗
ε,D
, however. This value is chosen so as to ensure that it
holds with probability at least 1 − ε/2 that, once all users have a non-empty set of confirmed blocks,
20Note that, according to our framework, users do not choose which messages are delivered to them. Of course, the
adversary may choose to ignore certain messages, but we shall suppose that the selected chain for any user is defined (as
above) as a function of their sequence of message deliveries. So the adversary does not choose their selected chain, but may
choose to produce blocks that do not extend it.
21For the sake of notational convenience, we have assumed that µ is fixed as part of the setting here, and so does not need
to be specified as another input parameter to the protocol (meaning, for example, that we consider ℓε,D rather than ℓε,D,µ). It is
not difficult, however, to see how our presentation could be modified to deal with varying µ. The same is true for other values
such as R0,R1 and ∆, which we consider for presentational convenience to be fixed, but which could alternatively be specified
as input parameters.
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every interval [t1, t2] of length at least
∆∗ := ℓ∗ε,D + 2∆
will be a growth interval. This follows since the longest chain C in any user’s message state at t1 will
be delivered to all users by t1 + ∆ (to be in a message state, a message has to be broadcast). Then, if
(†0) holds, some honest user will broadcast a chain strictly longer than C by t1 + ∆ + ℓ
∗
ε,D
, which will
be delivered to all users by t1 + ℓ
∗
ε,D
+ 2∆. Given this analysis, it’s tempting to define ℓε,D to be ∆
∗. The
difficulty, however, is that we need to allow some initial time for users to build up at least Nε,D many
blocks in their longest chain, so that they begin to have confirmed blocks. For this reason we define:
ℓε,D := (Nε,D + 1) · ∆
∗.
The permissioned reduct. We have already specified the instruction set, so it suffices to determine
an appropriate set T of permission tables for each tuple (U0,U1, ε,D). For a given execution (whether
permissioned or relative to the permitter), we let E be the set of all pairs (U, t) such that U is given
permission to broadcast a block B at t – we will refer to B as the block corresponding to (U, t). To
establish absolute security, we will use a version of the approach in [GKL18], simplified since we only
need to define and analyse the permissioned reduct at this stage. In particular, this means comparing
the number of blocks that the adversary is permitted to broadcast with the number of blocks that honest
users are permitted to broadcast in isolated intervals: We define (U, t) ∈ E to be isolated if U is honest
and there do not exist any (U′, t′) ∈ E such that U′ is honest and t′ ∈ [t − ∆, t + ∆]. If (U, t) is isolated,
then we may also refer to the corresponding block as isolated. If (U, t) ∈ E then we may refer to the pair
and the corresponding block as honest/dishonest when U is honest/dishonest. The point about isolated
blocks is the following (where the height of a block is its number of ancestors) :
(†1) If B is isolated, then any broadcast block B
′
, B of the same height must be dishonest.
To prove (†1), suppose that (U, t) is isolated, and that the corresponding block B is of height k. Towards
a contradiction, suppose also that B′ , B is of height k and is honest. Then B′ cannot be broadcast strictly
prior to t − ∆, otherwise B′ (and all ancestors) would be delivered to the user who controls U before t,
and B would not be broadcast by U at t. Also, B′ cannot be broadcast during [t − ∆, t + ∆] because B
is isolated. Then we also know that B′ cannot be broadcast after t + ∆ because it is honest, and B and
all ancestors will have been delivered to the honest producer of B by t + ∆. This gives the required
contradiction.
For any interval [t1, t2], we define:
• Xt1,t2 to be the blocks corresponding to pairs (U, t) ∈ E such that t ∈ [t1, t2];
• Yt1,t2 to be the blocks corresponding to isolated pairs (U, t) ∈ E such that t ∈ [t1 + ∆, t2 − ∆];
• Zt1,t2 to be the blocks corresponding to dishonest pairs (U, t) ∈ E such that t ∈ [t1, t2].
To define the permissioned reduct, we let T be the set of all permission tables T such that the following
holds for every execution relative to T consistent with the setting:
(⋄0) T is consistent with O and outputs M
′ = ∅ whenever given input (U,M, t′, A) at timeslot t, for
which t′ , t, or when a previous request has been submitted with respect to U at t.
(⋄1) For each interval [t1, t2] of length ≥ ℓ
∗
ε,D
, there exists at least one honest (U, t) ∈ E with t ∈ [t1, t2].
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(⋄2) For any interval [t1, t2], if |Xt1,t2 | ≥ Nε,D then |Yt1,t2 | > |Zt1,t2 |.
Roughly, (⋄0) just says that the permission table is like O, in the sense that it only listens to one request
per key at each timeslot, and then only gives permission to broadcast at most a single block at a time
(we will specify O precisely in Section 7.2). We will show that (⋄1) suffices to ensure absolute liveness,
and we will show that (⋄2) suffices to ensure absolute security.
Establishing absolute liveness. In order to prove that T is a permissioned reduct, we must show that it
ensures absolute liveness and absolute security. To deal with absolute liveness, it is useful to consider
a weakened version of growth intervals. Let ||M|| denote the length of the longest chain in M. For
timeslots t1 < t2, let l1 be the maximum value ||M1|| for any M1 which is a message state of any user at
any timeslot t ≤ t1, and let l2 be the minimum value ||M2|| for any M2 which is a message state of any
user at timeslot t2. We say that [t1, t2] is a weak growth interval if l2 > l1. In order to show that absolute
liveness is satisfied, we will prove that: (†2) So long as T ∈ T , any interval of length ∆
∗ is a weak growth
interval. This suffices to show absolute liveness, since then, letting t∗ be the first timeslot at which all
users have a non-empty set of confirmed blocks:
• Every interval [t1, t2] with t1 ≥ t
∗ and of length at least ∆∗ is a growth interval.
• It follows from the definition ℓε,D := (Nε,D + 1) · ∆
∗ and from (†2) (applied to the first Nε,D · ∆
∗
timeslots) that (t∗ exists and) every interval of length ℓε,D contains an interval [t1, t2] with t1 ≥ t
∗
and of length at least ∆∗.
That (†2) holds follows from precisely the same argument that we described previously in this sub-
section, when explaining the relevance of ℓ∗
ε,D
. Consider an interval [t1, t2] of length at least ∆
∗. The
longest chain C in any user’s message state at t1 will be delivered to all users by t1 + ∆. Then it follows
from (⋄1) that some honest user will broadcast a chain properly extending C by t1 +∆+ ℓ
∗
ε,D
, which will
be delivered to all users by t1 + ℓ
∗
ε,D
+ 2∆ = t1 + ∆
∗.
Establishing absolute security. For any chain C, let C∗ be C with the Nε,D many blocks of greatest
height removed. Towards a contradiction, suppose now that absolute security does not hold, so that there
exist U1,U2,C1,C2 and t1, t2, such that C1 is the selected chain for U1 at t1, C2 is the selected chain for
U2 at t2, but C
∗
1
and C∗
2
are incompatible, i.e. neither is an initial segment of the other. Without loss of
generality, we may suppose that these values are chosen so that |t1 − t2| is minimal, and so that (t1, t2) is
the lexicographically least possible choice subject to |t1 − t2| being minimal. Let B0 be the honest block
of greatest height in C1 ∩ C2. Let t0 be the timeslot at which B0 is given permission for broadcast (or if
B0 is the genesis block, let t0 = 0). Since the length of the selected chain for each user is monotonically
increasing over time, our choice of t1 and t2 leaves two possibilities. Either t1 = t2, or else t2 = t1 + 1.
Consider first the possibility that t1 = t2, and without loss of generality suppose |C2| ≥ |C1|. It follows
from (⋄2) that |Yt0,t1 | > |Zt0 ,t1 |. To obtain a contradiction, it therefore suffices to show that each element
of Yt0,t1 can be paired with a distinct element of Zt0,t1 . To see this, note that none of the blocks in Yt0,t1
can be of height greater than the leaf of C1, because this would contradict the fact that C1 is the selected
chain for U1 at t1. The claim therefore follows from the existence of C1 and C2 at t1, and from (†1).
Consider next the possibility that t2 = t1 + 1. To obtain a contradiction, it suffices to show that
each element of Yt0,t2 can be paired with a distinct element of Zt0,t2 . Now we divide into two subcases.
Suppose first that |C2| ≤ |C1|. In this case, no element of Yt0 ,t2 can be of height greater than the leaf of
C2, since this would contradict the fact that C2 is the selected chain for U2 at t2. As before, the claim
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therefore follows from (†1). Finally, consider the case that |C2| > |C1|. In this case, no element of Yt0,t2
can be of height greater than the leaf of C1, since such blocks must be broadcast at a timeslot ≤ t1,
and this would contradict the fact that (t1, t2) was specified as the lexicographically least possible choice
subject to |t1 − t2| being minimal. Once again, the claim therefore follows from (†1).
7.2 Specifying the Permitter
For a given execution of the protocol, we say that a set of responses from the permitter are consistent
with T if the permission table gives the same responses as the permitter to all sets of inputs given to the
permitter during the course of the execution.
Given a permissioned reduct PR = (I, T), we have two tasks with respect to the permitter O:
1. We must specify how the permitter is defined, i.e. we must specify the distribution on the response
of the permitter given each possible set of inputs.22
2. We must show that, when the protocol is run with security parameter ε, it holds with prob-
ability > 1 − ε that the permitter produces a set of responses that are consistent with some
T ∈ T(U0,U1, ε,D).
If we can achieve (2) above, then this suffices to establish uniform liveness and uniform security for the
protocol.
For the example of Bitcoin, we have already specified the permitter and the permissioned reduct. So it
remains to show that when the protocol is run with security parameter ε, it holds with probability > 1−ε
that the permitter produces a set of responses that are consistent with some T ∈ T(U0,U1, ε,D). This
now follows essentially as in [GKL18] (Theorem 31, which establishes that executions are ‘typical’ with
high probability) from standard concentration bounds. We refer the reader to that paper for the details.
The relationship to the permissioned setting. In the traditional permissioned setting, one can think
of the set of keys/users as being given as an input parameter. Who is allowed to broadcast and when
is then determined as a function of this input. More generally, the instructions to be carried out might
depend on the set of users as input, but it is instructive for us now to consider permissioned protocols
in which this input is used only to determine permissions to broadcast. The permissioned reduct, as we
have defined it here, is then a set of permissioned protocols. To deal with the permissionless setting, one
defines a permitter and then shows that, with high probability, it produces responses consistent with one
of the permissioned protocols in that set.
8 Final Discussion
There are many ways in which the framework we have presented could be expanded to more accurately
model consensus protocols in the permissionless setting. Here we just point out some of the principal
weaknesses.
User incentives. It is generally recognised in the blockchain community that the classical division into
honest and dishonest users is overly simplistic – while the relevance of user incentives is not specific
22Of course, there is some flexibility in terms of the order in which definitions are given here. One might also specify the
protocol first, and then the permissioned reduct second.
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to the permissionless context, it is nevertheless something which tends to be (rightly) prioritised in that
context. In the real world, users are not simply honest or otherwise, and a game theoretic analysis
can give much more robust performance guarantees than reliance on the honesty of certain users. For
the sake of simplicity, we have omitted any such game theoretic analysis here, but we regard it as an
important task to properly integrate our framework with an appropriate treatment of user incentives.
Realising the permitter. Part of the strength of the framework we have presented is that it blackboxes
the precise mechanics of the user selection process, allowing us to isolate the properties of the selection
process which are significant in the sense that they impact the way in which the protocol must be de-
signed, or influence properties of the resulting protocol. This allows us to prove general impossibility
results. In order to fully specify a usable protocol, however, it remains true that one has to actually
implement (an approximation to) the permitter oracle. It would be interesting to extend the framework
we have presented here, so as to also formalise the process of permitter implementation. Specifying and
analysing the full protocol would then consist of three tasks:
(a) Specifying a permissioned reduct;
(b) Specifying and analysing an appropriate permitter oracle;
(c) Proving that one can implement an appropriate approximation to the permitter.
Again, an advantage of this approach might be in the opportunity it provides for modular analysis –
many protocols will use essentially the same method of permitter implementation.
Other performance measures. For the sake of simplicity, we have concentrated here on the notions of
liveness and security. It is standard in the literature to consider also certain notions of ‘chain quality’
(see [GKL18], for example), which require that honest users produce at least a certain proportion of con-
firmed blocks. This suffices to ensure that transactions will actually be included in the set of confirmed
blocks within a certain bounded time (with high probability). Such considerations are clearly important
for a rigorous analysis of protocol performance.
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